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Richard A. Epsteint

Throughout the formative years of the common law, the rules of
civil procedure played a crucial role in the development of the substantive rules of law. Thus, the common law provided a distinct form of
action for each kind of wrong and specified complex rules-some of
general and some of particular application-for the elaboration of a
case within the framework of its appropriate form. The forms of
action have been abolished, as have most of the arcane rules of pleading that were so congenial to them. The rules of pleading today
retain some of their original importance to the ordinary lawsuit, but
their role is more modest. Under the most common view the pleadings are intended only to give to the adversary and the court "notice,"
in a general way, of the kinds of contentions that the pleader is apt
to make on his own behalf.1 They are not designed to bind the
pleader to a particular theory of claim or defense, nor to a particular
means of proving his contentions. With the pleadings thus restricted
to a notice function, the modem law instead draws upon an extensive arsenal of pre-trial devices to help determine the truth and the
2
worth of the contentions raised by the parties to a legal dispute.
In one sense the shift is a healthy one because it helps insure
that a lawsuit will be decided on its merits, and not by the procedural slips and errors that occur in the course of a lawsuit. Nonetheless, I think that the shift in emphasis has gone too far, and that many
of the prized modem reforms may be mistaken and ill-advised. Formal
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Southern California.
1
The only function left to be performed by the pleadings alone is that of notice.
For these reasons, pleadings under the rule may properly be a generalized summary
of the party's position, sufficient to advise the party for which incident he is being
sued, sufficient to show what was decided for purposes of res judicata, and sufficient
to indicate whether the case should be tried to the court or to a jury. No more is
demanded of pleadings than this; history shows that no more can be successfully
performed by pleadings.
C. WRIGHr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 283 (2d ed. 1970). See also C.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 11, at 57 (2d ed. 1947); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.2, at 60
(1965); Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1943).
2 F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 55-56.
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pleadings may not be the best devices for fleshing out the facts of a
case; but facts alone do not permit the articulation of the general
propositions of substantive law, the theories of claim and defense
needed for the principled resolution of disputes. It is to this task of
theory formation that the pleadings can make their contribution. The
rules of pleading cannot by themselves determine the applicable rules
of substantive law, but a set of rules that details the formal constraints
on legal argument could help to shape the substantive inquiry in a
manner that would aid the development of theories capable of both
particular application and further elaboration. If the rules of pleading are understood as means of delineating the distinctive features
of a legal argument, then there is much in the older systems of pleading
that merits attention even after the abolition of the forms of actions.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE RULES AS PRESUMPTIONS

This article is concerned with the rules of pleading insofar as they
represent the formal element in the law. The object of the inquiry
does not concern the application of the principles of formal logic to
the subject matter of law. While these rules must command respect
in legal analysis, they do not govern every step in the process of judgment. Law is not a closed system of logical thought, nor even a science,
like physics or economics, whose rules can be determined by a systematic examination and description of natural events or human behavior. Instead, in law, as in ethics, the purpose of the inquiry is to
"give reasons" to judge and evaluate human conduct.3 As Hume noted
long ago, it is impossible, solely by use of the rules of logic to derive
an ethical conclusion from premises that contain no ethical term. 4
Neither formal logic nor science can make judgments of value or
worth. Yet it is essential for a system of law, like one of ethics, to
move from the description of a state of affairs to a conclusion about
the rights and duties of those involved. The rules of a legal system,
unlike those of science and logic, must establish the relationship between the descriptive and the normative.
Legal systems use many of the terms that have a central place in
both logic and the sciences, but often with subtle, though crucial, differences in meaning. One such term is of special importance here.
The legal system uses the term "sufficient," as in the expression "facts
3 Thus, a system of legal rules has functions that go beyond compulsion and prediction.
For a discussion of this "internal" aspect of rules, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEIT OF LAW,
55-56, 86-88 (1961).
4 D. HUME, A TREATIsE OF HUMAN NATURE, Book III, Part I, Section I, at 469 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed. 1888).
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sufficient to state a cause of action." But it would be a mistake to
assume that this term carries over its logical connotation into the law.
In logic, we say that A is a sufficient condition for B, when, if A is
true, then B of necessity follows. When the law tries to generate
absolute or universal propositions that make certain conditions sufficient, in the logical sense, for the creation of responsibility, there
is always room to doubt whether the conclusion follows from the
premise. Consider, for example, the proposition that a man should
be held responsible to someone whom he harms.5 The proposition has
its appeal, but its truth is not absolute. To treat it as such would be
unjust in at least some cases, for at the very least cases of consent and
self-defense are apparent exceptions to the general rule.6 Since there
are exceptions, it is tempting to argue that the general principle is
worth nothing at all; in logic, one counterexample would be sufficient to show that a supposedly general principle is false. If law were
treated as a closed logical system, the specter of possible and plausible
exceptions to every proposed rule would defeat all attempts to formulate general legal principles. But even if the law is not a dosed system
of logic, it does not follow that it is impossible to bring order to the
legal system. The question is not whether there are exceptions to
propositions that purport to be sufficient to create liability. Rather,
the question is why it is necessary to think of exceptions to the general
proposition at all.
Compare, for example, the proposition that a man should be held
responsible because he has harmed another with the proposition
that he should be held responsible because he has thought of another.
Both statements purport to be universal, and both are in some sense
false. There is, nonetheless, a crucial difference between them. The
second proposition would not be entitled to a presumption of validity
in any system of legal thought. One hardly feels compelled even to
give a reason why a man who has thought of another should not be
held liable to him. It is, however, arguable that the first proposition,
though not conclusive, is entitled to a presumption of validity that retains its force in general even if subject to exceptions in particular
cases. It may not by itself state all of the relevant considerations, but
5 See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL Su iEs 151 (1973), where I
argued for this positiorfon substantive grounds.
6 Note, I do not discuss here the fact that many rules of law will take, for reasons of
administrative convenience, an absolute form. It may well prove too costly to administer
a set of "just" laws. But it is important to know what one thinks is right in the abstract,
because only if that is known will it be possible to decide what substantive points must
be sacrificed to administrative convenience.
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it says enough that the party charged should be made to explain or
deny the allegation to avoid responsibility; the plaintiff has given
a reason why the defendant should be held liable, and thereby invites
the defendant to provide a reason why, in this case, the presumption
should not be made absolute. The presumption lends structure to the
argument, but it does not foreclose its further development.
The frequent use of presumptions is enough to show that they are
of great importance to the law. But there are areas of the law that
are not amenable to their use. First, the use of presumptions does not
imply that legal concept cannot, be defined in terms of logically necessary and sufficient conditions. Indeed, presumptions play no role in
many legal definitions. Professor H.L.A. Hart has argued that the term
"contract," for example, can be defined only by taking into account
the possible defenses to an action for breach of contract But when we
say that fraud in the inducement is a defense to an action on the contract, we do not define, in whole or in part, the term "contract." The
defense of fraud presupposes the existence of a contract, however defined, and gives a reason why the plaintiff should not have a remedy
for the defendant's failure to perform. It operates to defeat the inference of liability that would otherwise follow from proof of the assertion that the defendant did not perform his part of the agreement,
but it tells us nothing of the meaning of the term contract. Defeasibility, regarded by Hart as an aspect of the definition of contract,
is undoubtedly an important feature of legal thought, but it is a characteristic of the legal rules of obligation, and not of the definition of
a legal concept.8 A contract can be defined as an agreement between
two or more parties for one or more of them to do, or to forbear
from doing, a future act.0 If this definition is unacceptable it is not
because there are, unavoidably, exceptions or qualifications that can7 H.L.A. Hart, The Assumption of Responsibility and Rights, in LoGIC AND LANGUAGE,
lsr SERIES (A. Flew, ed. 1965) 151, 155. Hart has indeed abandoned this article, at

least so far as it defended the proposition that "[t]he sentences 'I did it,' 'you did it,' 'he
did it' are ... primarily utterances with which we confess or admit liability, make accusations, or ascribe responsibility" instead of describing conduct. Id. 160. Harts abandonment of this article, see H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILrrY (1968), was prompted
by two excellent articles, Geach, Ascriptivism, PsLosoHxcA. REviEw 221 (1960); Pitcher,
Hart on Action and Responsibility, id., 226. Nonetheless, Hart's article is so rich in ideas
that we can still profit from both its mistakes and its insights.
8 Pitcher makes a similar point when he notes "that it is the concept of being de-

serving of censure or punishment which is really the relevant defeasible one," not that of
human action, Pitcher, supra note 7, at 235. However, this statement is not quite broad
enough because it does not take into account cases of civil responsibility, as in tort, which

operate in the same fashion even though neither censure nor punishment is involved.
9 The definition could be rejected on the grounds that all contracts require both
parties to perform some future act or forbearance. Such is the impact of the common law
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not be captured by the logical model of necessary and sufficient conditions. Those exceptions and qualifications are of concern only if
it is suggested that there should be a rule that a party to a contract
invariably has a right to relief against another party who does not
keep his part of the agreement.
The weakness of Hart's position is made clearer when we try to
distinguish "legal concepts" from other concepts. "Legal concepts"
are those that the law regards as material to the decision of legal
issues. Thus, "possession" is a legal concept not because it has some
unique logical feature or refers to some inherently legal phenomenon,
but because it is used to decide legal disputes. "Cat" is not generally
thought to be a legal concept, but it would become one if it were
made an operative term in a Uniform Cats Act. 1 Indeed, the list of
legal concepts could be expanded to include every word in the English language if the law of obligations were sufficiently transformed.
If legal concepts could not be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, then no concept could be so defined, since every
concept can be pressed into the service of the law. Hart's account of
defeasibility, therefore, can and should be recognized as applicable to
legal rules rather than to legal definitions. As such, it represents an
insight of fundamental importance for the theory of legal argumentation.
A second area in which presumptions are of little use is in connection with those legal rules that do not, in terms, purport to answer
questions of responsibility. The rule against perpetuities, for example,
states that "no interest is good, unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.""i This rule, famous for its mathematical structure, rests not
on assessed probabilities of events, but only on the logical possibility
doctrine of "consideration" which, in forni at least, attempts to limit the class of contracts to the class of bargains.
Note, too, that the account given in the text differs from the standard definitions insofar
as the latter tend to stress the notion of legal enforceability. Thus, a contract is an "agreement enforceable at law, made between two or more persons, by which rights are acquired
by one or more to acts or forbearances on the part of the other or others." W. ANSON,
LAW oF CONTRACT 11 (1st Am. ed. E. Huffcut 1895), cited in A. CORBIN, CORBxN ON CONTRACTs (One Vol. ed. 1952). There are, however, many contracts which are unenforceable
at least in some circumstances, such as illegal contracts. These, moreover, are not nullities; title to property for example, will pass under an illegal contract, but it will not pass
by delivery absent agreement. It is better, therefore, to keep the notion of enforceability
separate and apart from the definition of contract.
10 Simpson, The Analysis of Legal Concepts, 80 L.Q. REv. 535, 547 (1964).
11 J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUlTIES § 201 (4th ed. R. Gray 1942). There is,
for example, the same kind of formal completeness in the rules of chess, to the extent
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of remote vesting. The rule against perpetuities does not purport to
state a cause of action or a defense. Its application presupposes that
the instrument that governed the disposition of the res-be it deed or
will-was valid as a matter of substantive law. And even then, the
rule determines only whether a given person receives an interest in
property under the instrument, not the rights and duties that ownership entails.
Even after these qualifications are taken into account, however, a
system of substantive legal rules remains a complex network of presumptions-or to use Hart's language, of defeasible propositions-insofar as it seeks to establish the relationship between matters of fact on
the one hand and judgments about responsibility on the other. The
purpose of this article is to show what formal constraints must be
imposed upon legal argument when it is viewed in this light. The
nature of these constraints is best revealed by examining three distinct and familiar aspects of the law of pleading, in order to show
how they relate both to each other and to our common theme. These
are: (1) the distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate issues of fact; (2) the division of the elements of a case into a cause of
action and the possible defenses thereto; and (3) the proper means
of allocating the different elements of the case between the plaintiff
and defendant.
II.

FORMAL CONSEQUENCES OF A SYSTEM OF PRESUMPTIONS

A.

Ultimate Issues of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The formal characteristics of a system of presumptions limit the
kinds of allegations that are appropriate to any legal theory. Assume,
for the moment, that the plaintiff's allegation, "the defendant unlawfully struck the plaintiff," states a prima facie case. What argument
can the defendant make that admits the allegation in the complaint,
yet supports the contention that he should not be held liable? Clearly,
there is none. Once he has admitted that his conduct is "unlawful,"
it is no longer possible to find an excuse or justification appropriate
to a plea in avoidance. The problem with this form of allegation,
therefore, is not that it is too weak, but rather that it is too strong.
The plaintiff's prima facie case should erect a presumption that shifts
the burden of explanation to the other party; it should not foreclose
all possibility of explanation.
that they are designed to tell us what counts as a move within the game. But those rules
quickly lose their mathematical texture insofar as they govern the rights and duties of the
players. Witness here the disputes that surrounded the Fischer-Spassky match.
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The same observation can be made with respect to certain pleas
raised by the defendant. If the defendant pleads, in response to the
allegation that he struck the plaintiff, that he did so with the plaintiff's "valid" and "binding" consent, the defense is too strong. The
plaintiff cannot admit the sufficiency of the defense and still claim
that he is entitled to recover, for example, on the ground that the
consent was procured by fraud. Allegations using terms such as "lawfully," "unlawfully," and "validly" must be regarded as impermissible
-as a logical matter-regardless of the substantive legal theory applicable to the case. Such allegations seek to create a logical basis for
determining questions of responsibility that circumvents the normative process of judgment that must always be part of a system of law.
The same argument applies to another class of terms-murder, trespass, theft and the like-that also have their place in legal argument.
Murder, for example, is usually defined as the deliberate killing of
another person without lawful justification or excuse. 12 The last clause
in this definition, however, assumes the conclusion that the conduct
is unlawful. While deliberate killings may be excused or justified,
by definition there can be neither excuse nor justification for murder.
A system of presumptions, therefore, cannot on formal grounds alone
accept the allegation that A murdered B. If, however, the "without
lawful justification or excuse" clause is struck from the account of
murder, then what remains of the definition says, in effect, that deliberate killing creates a prima facie case of murder. It would then be
possible, through further pleas, to develop case by case the exceptions
to the presumption suggested by the definition. Only after the presumption of murder is established in a particular case, and none of
the exceptions is found to apply, is it possible to use the term "murder"
as a premise of some further legal argument-for example, one that
concerns the appropriate punishment for the crime.
There are, however, many allegations that contain terms with explicit "legal" content that do fit into a scheme of presumptions, and
these should be regarded, to use the standard terminology, not as
conclusions of law but as ultimate issues of fact. Assume the plaintiff alleges that his agent sold and delivered goods to the defendant
for which he has not been paid. Although the allegation contains
terms, like "agent," "sold," "delivered," and "paid," that presuppose
the conceptual scheme of the law of contracts, it is perfectly permissible
in a system of presumptions. The allegation allows the defendant to
12 "Murder is homicide committed with malice aforethought," and, every intentional
killing is with malice aforethought unless under the circumstances sufficient to institute (1)
justification, (2) excuse, or (3) mitigation. R. PERKINS, CamiSNAL LAw 34, 35 (1969).
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concede both its truth and sufficiency, and nonetheless to argue that
there are further circumstances that excuse him from paying for the
goods. Contrary to what Pomeroy long ago asserted, the parties need
not be required to allege only the "bare" or "naked" facts in order to
assure that their pleadings contain only ultimate facts. 13 Rather, they
should be allowed to present legal issues in the same terms that judges
use to formulate the rules of law. If a rule refers to agents, promises, sale
and delivery, and the like, then the ultimate issues of a case must be
framed in terms of those concepts. 14 They are compatible with a system of presumptions, and cannot be excluded on the ground that they
represent conclusions of law. If propositions that contain them are to
be rejected at all, it must be for substantive reasons.
If this view is accepted instead of Pomeroy's, it is incorrect to argue,
as did Walter Wheeler Cook, that the difference between ultimate
issues of fact and conclusions of law is at best one of degree and not
of kind. Cook puts the argument as follows:
Suppose I am looking out of the window of the room in which you
and I are and you ask me: "What do you see?" Any reply I make,
assuming I see 'something,' will be a 'statement of fact.' Suppose
my reply is: "I see an object": this tells you something but not
much; nevertheless it is a 'statement of fact.' Perhaps you ask for a
more detailed statement. I reply: "I see an inorganic object." You
now know more than before, but perhaps you are still not satisfied,
and my next reply may be: "I see a vehicle." This is equally a
'statement of fact,' as will be a statement that "I see an automobile." I may under your urging go on to more and more detailed
statements, such as: "I see a five passenger sedan;" "I see a 1935
Ford four-door sedan, with blue body and black wheels"; and so
13 J. POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGRTS §§ 530, 532 (3d ed. 1894).
14 Those results, of course, are pretty much obtained in the cases. Thus, to take only one

line of cases, allegations have been held proper which state that one is the "owner" of
property, Peninsula Properties Co. v. Santa Cruz, 34 Cal. 2d 626, 629, 213 P.2d 489, 490-91
(1950); an act was "negligently" done, Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 149,
154, 157 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1945); an employee "was acting within the scope of his employment,"
May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 707, 271 P. 789, 791-92 (1928); plaintiff's name had acquired "a secondary meaning." Dino, Inc. v. Boreta Enterprises, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 2d
336, 338, 38 Cal. Rptr. 167, 168 (1964). In the last of these cases the court said that the
allegation is "obviously" a conclusion of law, but allowed the allegation on the grounds
that the defendant had specific information about the case which made more detailed
pleading unnecessary. Given the tests in the text, the term cannot be regarded as a conclusion of law regardless of the defendant's state of knowledge because the defendant
could concede that the plaintiffs name has received a secondary meaning and still explain
why he should be allowed to use it. If the defendant does not know enough about the
facts of the plaintiff's case to conduct his defense, he should resort to some form of
pre-trial discovery.
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on. Each statement becomes more and more detailed, tells you
more and more about what you could see if you were to look.15
He concludes from the above that "the time-honored distinction between 'statements of fact' and 'conclusions of law' is merely one of
degree, comparable to the difference between saying: "I see an object"
and "I see a sedan" in the example given above."' 6 A given state of affairs may indeed be described in a large, possibly infinite, number of
ways, but the relationship between this observation and the distinction
between issues of ultimate fact and conclusions of law is not at all
clear. As Cook correctly points out, the "facts" of the case will not present themselves. But there is no reason to believe that the distinction
between ultimate issues of fact and conclusions of law should present
them for us; that is a task for the substantive law.' V Thus, allegations
about the year and body type of an automobile can be struck from the
pleadings because, as a matter of substantive law, they are insufficient,
in conjunction with other allegations, to create or limit responsibility:
generally, tort remedies do not depend upon the descriptions of the
property damaged, however useful they may be to identify it. If the
applicable substantive theories were changed to subject 1935 Fords to
special rules, however, the stricture against pleading conclusions of
law would not prevent their inclusion in the case of either party, for the
only function of the distinction between ultimate issues and conclusions of law is to exclude those allegations that cannot fit into a system
of presumptions.
To make the discussion concrete, consider the alternative allegations
that, Professor James suggests might be made by a plaintiff in a typical
accident case:
1. Defendant is legally liable to plaintiff for damages.
2. Defendant negligently caused plaintiff injury.
3. Defendant negligently caused plaintiff bodily injury through
the operation of a motor vehicle.
4. Defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff
who was then crossing [named] highway. As a result plaintiff
was thrown down and had his leg broken, etc.
5. Same as # 4 with an added paragraph following the first, as
follows:
The defendant was negligent in that he failed to keep a
proper lookout, drove at excessive speed, etc.
15 Cook, Facts and Statement of Fact, 4 U. Cm. L. Riv. 283, 241 (1937).
16 Id. at 244.
17 There is an important distinction between those pleas which are rejected because
they are conclusions of law and those which are legally insufficient. With the scheme of
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6. Same as # 4 with an added paragraph following the first, as
follows:
The defendant was negligent in that he was looking at a
passenger in the back seat of his automobile and not in the
direction in which he was going; in that he was driving at a
speed of 43 miles per hour, etc.' 8
Each of these allegations raises different problems. The first allegation
does not on its face purport to state a prima facie case that admits of
exceptions; it is clearly a conclusion of law and, hence, is impermissible
in a system of presumptions. In contrast, none of the other propositions
is necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion that the defendant is not
liable. Nonetheless, they too have difficulties of their own.
The substantive law of negligence requires the plaintiff to show,
prima facie, that the defendant owed him a duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach caused (in a weak
sense) injury to the plaintiff. 19 None of these elements is put into relief
if the plaintiff alleges-as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowonly that the defendant "negligently caused plaintiff injury," or
"negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff." 20 Indeed, the
allegation that the defendant's automobile struck the plaintiff is in itself
of no legal significance once a trespass theory is discarded. In this form,
the pleadings offer only the most general structure of analysis, with no
a multiple staged pleading, a plea which is formally adequate though legally insufficient
can be reintroduced at a further stage in the argument. A plea, however, which is defective on formal grounds can never be reused, no matter how many stages the argument is
taken.
18 F. JAMES, supra note I, at 70.
19 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw or TORTS § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971). Note that
causation is used here in the sense peculiar to negligence law, as a peculiar amalgam of
"but for" causation and proximate cause. For a substantive criticism of these two notions,

see Epstein, supra note 5.
20

2. On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Bolyston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then
crossing said highway.

3. As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken and was otherwise
injured, was prevented from transacting his business, suffered great pain of body and
mind, and incurred expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the sum
of one thousand dollars.
Form 9, FED. R. Cry. PRO. Note the one advantage of the Federal Rules is that they
reduce the problems of variance because one does not need to specify the particulars of
negligence at the outset. Still, that practical advantage is not decisive given the easy
opportunity for amendment both before and at trial. FED. R. Crv. PRO. Rule 15(a)-(b). But
there also may be practical disadvantages to the Federal system. Assume that one pleads in
the fashion of Form 9 and that during discovery some theories of negligence are probed,
but others are not. Should one of the unexamined lines of inquiry be the decisive line of

proof, there will be at trial no need for amendment, and great difficulty, perhaps, in
getting a continuance for want of a variance, even in cases of genuine surprise.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[40:556

clues as to the relevant particulars. "Negligently" is but a shorthand for
the complex of relations that are material to the statement of a prima
facie case set out above. It should be necessary to identify the duty, the
breach, and the causal relationship of the defendant to the harm that
the plaintiff has suffered. Otherwise the pleadings do not raise the ultimate issues of the case.
The kind of information required to raise the ultimate issues of the
prima facie case only begins to appear in the more detailed of James's
versions of the complaint, those alleging "excessive speed" or "failure
to keep a proper lookout." These versions of the complaint, however,
still fail to specify the duty incumbent on the defendant; for example,
the complaint does not allege the speed limit applicable to the case,
that the defendant exceeded that limit, or that the plaintiff's harm could
have been avoided had the defendant complied with the limit. It is not
helpful merely to allege, as in James's sixth alternative, that the defendant drove at forty-three miles per hour. That is only one of a range
of speeds consistent with the plaintiffs prima facie case. If the defendant
had been traveling at any other speed over the limit it would not alter
the theory of relief, even if it could affect the proof of causation or the
measure of damages. Similarly, the defendant's failure to keep his eyes
on the road may constitute, prima facie, a breach of a duty owed to the
plaintiff, but it is not ultimate, for it is of no moment to the theory of
recovery whether the defendant looked at a passenger in the back seat
or fell asleep.
These remarks illustrate the importance of an exact knowledge of
the substantive theory in question in order to distinguish ultimate
issues of fact from the questions of proof that they raise.21 Furthermore,
they support the conclusion that, in a system of presumptions, the
distinction between ultimate issues of fact and conclusions of law is one
of kind and not of degree.
B.

Division of Elements of a Case into Claim and Defense
The simple division of the elements of a lawsuit into claim and defense, generally accepted in the modem law, cannot be retained in a
system of rules based on presumptions. To see the weakness of the
division, we need only consider the options available to the defendant
once the plaintiff has stated what he regards to be his prima facie case.
21 The distinction between ultimate facts and evidence thus also makes good sense as
well. Indeed, the only way in which one can tell whether a given piece of evidence is
relevant to an issue is to know the issue to be decided. The rule against pleading evidence will not tell us what an ultimate issue is, but identification of the ultimate issue,
coupled with the rules of relevance, should tell us what counts as evidence.
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First, in any system of pleading, the defendant can deny the truth of
the plaintiff's allegations. A denial does not speak to the legal sufficiency
of the plaintiff's allegations; it raises an issue of fact. The question
could be simple: did the defendant have the green light when he
entered the intersection? Or it could be quite complex: did the activities of the defendant amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade?
Whatever the question, a denial will in the end require a judgment of
true or false.
Second, if the defendant is unable or unwilling to dispute the truth
of the plaintiff's allegations, he can argue that, as a matter of legal
policy, the allegations made do not give any reason for the court to
disturb the parity that existed between the parties at the outset of the
lawsuit. The defendant's demurrer assumes the truth of the plaintiff's
allegations but challenges their legal sufficiency. It does not tell us how
to decide the legal issue it raises, for it only responds to the formal
needs of the system. If the demurrer is sustained, then the defendant's
conduct is, in effect, held not to require any explanation, and we reach
a dead end in the development of substantive law that makes further
pleas neither possible nor necessary. As it has so often been said, a bad
22
plea is a sufficient answer to a bad cause of action.
Where it is not possible to question either the truth or the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant's third course is to
enter a plea in avoidance. 23 Since the allegations of a prima facie case
can create only a presumption of liability, the defendant must be allowed to offer an explanation of the conduct alleged in the complaint.
That explanation must admit the truth of all the plaintiff's allegations,
and concede that the complaint states a prima facie case. It must also
allege "new matter," consistent with all prior allegations, sufficient to
defeat the inference from facts to liability that the plaintiff seeks to
establish.
As we have seen, if the defendant chooses to deny or demur, issue is
joined and it remains only to decide a question of fact or a point of
law. When, however, an affirmative plea in avoidance is entered, the
issue cannot, as a matter of logic, be joined. The plaintiff must be
allowed to respond to the defendant's affirmative plea in any of the
22 C. CLARK, supra note 1, § 83.

23 At common law, the plea was known as one of confession and avoidance. The term
"confession" was added because the defendant could not plead in avoidance if he denied
or demurred. As an administrative matter, there was no doubt much efficiency to this
system of elections, but it was doubtless productive of much injustice as well. Today, the
defendant is allowed in most jurisdictions, a free choice amongst these alternatives. But
these rules of election are of no concern here because we are only interested in seeing how
these options fit into the formal structure of a legal argument.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[40:556

three ways that were open to the defendant after the plaintiff stated
his prima facie case. Denial of the defendant's allegations is as appropriate as a denial of the allegations in the prima facie case, for their
truth could be disputed in either case.2 4 Similarly, a demurrer is appropriate to determine the legal sufficiency of the defense. What is crucial,
however, is that a further plea in avoidance is proper as well. Once the
model of logically sufficient conditions is abandoned, the plaintiff must
speak in terms of presumptions and not of absolute rules. The same
requirement applies to the defendant: the modem division of a case
into claim and defense should not obscure the fact that we work within
a system of presumptions. The defendant's plea in avoidance only raises
a presumption that the defendant can explain the conduct attributed
to him. That explanation should in principle be subject to a further
exception, again introducing new matter, consistent with all prior
allegations, to override the defense established by the defendant's plea.
Indeed, three stages of pleading may not be enough, for there is no
logical point at which the legal system, rather than the parties, can
decide that all matter relevant to the lawsuit has been introduced. If
the plaintiff replies with a further plea in avoidance at the third stage
of the case, the defendant must be given a further opportunity to
counter the plaintiff's affirmative plea-the explanation of the explanation-by a further plea in avoidance. The system presupposes the "essential incompleteness of legal rules," for the case remains subject to
further elaboration until one of the parties decides to join an issue
either of law or of fact. As the common law system of special pleadings,
with its uncouth replications, rejoinders, surrejoinders and the like,
recognized, some cases can only be adequately framed after many rounds
of argument.2 5 The federal rules, with their reduced emphasis on the
pleadings, do not allow the parties to develop the case in the manner
required by a system of presumptions because the pleadings typically
end at the second stage.
The strengths of a system of indefinite pleas can be illustrated by a
simple three-stage argument. Let "X" represent the plaintiff's prima
facie case, "Y" the defendant's plea in avoidance, and "Z" the plaintiff's
response thereto.2 6 Is it necessary to put the argument in this form, or
24 The Federal Rules do not provide for joinder of issue where the plaintiff wishes to
deny affirmative defenses raised in the answer. FED. R. Civ. Pao. Rule 8(d).
25 See B. SHmPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING, §§ 13, 14 (5d ed. H. Ballantine 1923).
26 Note that these three allegations must be consistent with each other since the pattern
of argument assumes that all of them can be true at one time. The requirement of consistency does not apply, however, whenever one of the inconsistent pleas will be immaterial after the introduction of the evidence. Thus there is no reason to say that the de-
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could it be said that X and Z together make a prima facie case to which
Y is an insufficient defense? If it could, then the two-staged argument of
modem pleading systems sets out, and in a more efficient form, all of the
information conveyed by the complicated structure of common law
pleading. As reformulated into two stages, however, the argument does
not indicate how the case should be decided if X is true, and both Y and
Z are false. The two-stage argument indicates that X and Z together
make a prima facie case, but it does not and cannot tell us that while X
is always material, Z is relevant to the argument if and only if Y is true.
If Z is intended to be an exception to an exception (here Y), it cannot
be treated as a part of the prima facie case.
To give the argument concrete form, assume that X is "the defendant
did not keep his part of the bargain," Y is "the defendant was an infant," and Z is "the plaintiff delivered necessaries to the infant in the
performance of his part of the bargain." If these allegations are true,
then it does not matter whether the parties are limited to pleading
single statements of claim and defense or are allowed to continue indefinitely until one of them decides to join an issue. Both theories yield
the same substantive result. Even if the plaintiff is required to prove
as part of his prima facie case both that the defendant did not keep his
part of the bargain (X) and that the plaintiff provided necessaries when
he kept his (Z), he will be able to recover, as a matter of substantive
law, regardless of whether the defendant can show that he is an infant

(Y).

Suppose, however, that the plaintiff proves that the defendant did not
keep his part of the bargain (X), and that the defendant is not an infant
(not Y). Under these circumstances, it is not clear whether the plaintiff
should be allowed to recover without also proving that he provided
necessaries (Z). In the previous hypothetical, where X, Y, and Z were
true, the plaintiff was required to show, as part of his prima facie case,
both that he had provided necessaries and that the defendant did not
keep his part of the bargain. If that requirement accurately reflected
the requirements of the substantive law, then the plaintiff does not
make out a prima facie case by showing only that the defendant did not
keep his part of the bargain. Under the substantive law, however, this
allegation does state a prima facie case. It is not clear, therefore, why
fendant cannot plead two inconsistent affirmative defenses in response to a prima facie
case, so long as each of those answers is consistent with it. Here the inconsistency in the
pleadings do not signal a permanent defect in the structure of the argument. The Federal
Rules are clearly correct from a pleading standpoint when they allow inconsistent allegations to be made alternatively in a claim or defense, or indeed in any other plea as well.
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(e)(2).
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the plaintiff should be required to include in his prima facie case an
allegation that he provided the defendant with necessaries when the
defendant's infancy might never be put in issue. If the delivery of
necessaries (Z) is material only if it can be shown that the defendant is
an infant, then it follows that the issue of necessaries should be raised
only after the infancy question is pleaded as a defense.2 7 That is the
result under a system of indefinite pleas: the plaintiff's provision of
necessaries is a sufficient reply to the defense of infancy, which raises
only a presumption that the defendant is not liable. It is thus possible
to treat the proposition "defendant did not keep his part of the bargain"
(X) as the entire prima facie case even though it does not contain all
the allegations that the plaintiff may need to prove in order to recover.
A system of staged pleadings can also help to clarify difficult issues of
substantive law, a point illustrated by the case of the infant's contract.
When the plaintiff states a prima facie case merely by alleging that
the defendant did not keep his part of the bargain, the appropriate
measure of damages is the value of the defendant's performance to the
plaintiff, that is, the price of the goods. The defendant then relies on
the defense of infancy, which, in effect, reduces the measure of damages
to zero. Since the plaintiff may plead further, however, the issues of
liability and damages are not yet finally resolved. When the plaintiff
shows that he provided the defendant with necessaries, he is again
entitled to recover. But now the appropriate measure of damages is the
value of the plaintiff's performance to the defendant, if it is less than
the value of defendant's promise. 28 The measure of recovery thus de-

pends upon the last valid plea in the case shown to be true. A system
of staged pleadings shows that it is futile to search for a single standard
of recovery applicable to every contract case.
The three-stage argument also illustrates how difficult it is to classify
actions by their theories of recovery. The prima facie case in the example above is appropriate to a contract action. To the extent that
27 The common law system of staged pleading is used to account for infant's liability
in Guardians of Pontypridd Union v. Drew, [1927] 1 K.B. 214. "The old course of pleading
was a count for goods sold and delivered, a plea of infancy, and a replication that the
goods were necessaries; and then the plaintiff did not necessarily recover the price alleged,
he recovered a reasonable price for the necessaries." Id. at 220.
Two points should be noted about the argument. First, it is not clear that the prima
facie case need contain an allegation that the goods were delivered, since the nonperformance of a fully executory contract is in general actionable. The delivery of the goods
should be raised in the replication. Second, it does not follow that this form of pleading "does not imply a consensual contract" for the supply of the goods alone is insufficient without the agreement. See generally Miles, The Infant's Liability for Necessaries,
43 L.Q. REV. 389 (1927) (discussion of the basis of infant's liability).
28 G.C. CHISHIRE & C.H.S. FiFooT, THE ILAW OF CONTRACT 370 (7th ed. 1969).
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considerations of jurisdiction, venue, statutes of limitations, conflicts of
law and so on turn on the characterization of the prima facie case, the
action must be treated as one in contract. When attention is directed
to the third stage of the argument, however, the action seems to be
based on quasi-contractual notions; the defendant has been unjustly
enriched in that he received from the plaintiff a benefit for which he
has not paid. Nonetheless, since the plaintiff must plead and prove
the agreement between the parties in order to reach the third stage of
the argument, the action should not be classified as quasi-contractual.
It cannot be said simply that the defendant "is bound, not because he
has agreed, but because he has been supplied.1 29 The case has two "becauses," the first of which is the agreement to purchase. Had there
been no agreement between the parties, the plaintiff might still be able
to recover, but not on the simple allegation that he provided the defendant with necessaries. The allegation presupposes the two prior stages
of the argument, the first of which alleged the agreement. By itself it
does not state a cause of action. The formal rules of pleading do not
provide the basis of a "pure" theory of quasi-contract, apart from agreement, but they do help identify those situations in which one is necessary for the plaintiff to recover.3 0 The prohibition against pleading conclusions of law clearly will not allow the plaintiff to allege only that
the defendant was "unjustly" enriched at his expense.
C.

Allocation of Issues in a Case

The last problem raised by a system of presumptions concerns the
proper allocation of issues between the parties. It is, moreover, a problem that must be faced whether we adopt the conventional two-staged
29 Ird.
30 See Leoni v. Delany, 83 Cal. App. 2d 303, 188 P.2d 765 (1948), for a situation which

raises the same question where the defendant is able to interpose the statute of frauds
in a contract action. The court allows the plaintiff to plead a quasi-contractual count as
an alternative to the contract action. The court treats the two counts as though they

stated separate and independent causes of action, but that cannot be the case because
the second complaint is good only because there is the first claim which pleads the bargain and its nonperformance which is met by the statute of frauds. The court does note
that: "It is the unenforceability of an otherwise valid contract which gives rise to the

right of relief through the medium of the common count. The law contemplates that
when one receives a benefit at the expense or the detriment of another, he should compensate the latter to the extent of the reasonable value of the benefit received." Id. at 307, 188
P.2d at 767. The second proposition is broader than the first, and of itself suggests that
even a person who intended his services as a gift could afterwards recover damages to the
extent of their value. The proposition only makes sense, therefore, to the extent that it
presupposes that the contract is "unenforceable" because of the statute of frauds. The
entire matter can, moreover, be better stated if one dispenses with the notion that there
are two distinct actions, and says instead that the allegation of a benefit provided is a good
reply to the defense based upon the statute of frauds.
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system of argument or the more complex system of multiple staged
argument just developed and explained, for in both cases the plaintiff
and the defendant must share the burden of raising the material issues
in a case.
In the two-staged system this question has been treated as one of
allocating a case between its "ifs" and its "unlesses," where the "ifs"
are those allegations assigned to the plaintiff, and the "unlesses" are
those assigned to the defendant. 31 In the context of this system, the
solution to the allocation problem has only limited substantive significance. True, it is important that the plaintiff state at least some
reason why he should be able to recover; otherwise who would hesitate
to sue? But once a bare minimum of issues is allocated to the plaintiff,
there are many issues that could be allocated to either party without
substantive effect. 32 No matter how the infancy issue in a contracts case
is allocated, for example, the plaintiff will be able to prevail only if
the defendant is not an infant; otherwise he must fail. The allocation of
that issue only determines whether infancy is treated as an indispensable part of the prima facie case-an "if"-or, in the alternative, as an
absolute defense-an "unless." In a two-staged system, the infancy of
the defendant thus appears to be a logically sufficient condition for the
defeat of the plaintiff's contract claim. That result may not correspond
to the substantive law, but the pleading rule that limits the argument to
two stages makes it appear plausible by suggesting that a defense, unlike a prima facie case, is never subject to exceptions.
Questions of allocation take on greater importance when the parties
are allowed to plead indefinitely until issue is joined, because now the
allocation of a single issue can determine the structure of the case at all
31 See Cleary, Presumingand Pleading:An Essay on JuristicImmunity, 12 STAN. L. REv.
5, 6 (1959).
32 Occasionally there will be reasons apart from the structure of the legal argument,
to decide how a particular issue will be allocated. For example, a party may try to bring
or remove his case into federal court under its "federal question" jurisdiction. In order to
do that, he must show that his case is one which "arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). That requirement has been
construed to mean that plaintiff must show that the federal question is raised as part of
his complaint, which in turn means that this test will be operative only if there is some
theory which tells us that the question of allocation is not arbitrary. Thus, in Louisville
&cNashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), the Supreme Court held, on its own
motion, that a case could not be removed to a federal court where the only federal questions concerned the application and construction of a federal statute which in terms
forbade railroads from issuing free passes. The court held that the contracts case did not
arise under the federal statute because it had to be pleaded as an affirmative defense in
the ordinary contract action. Perhaps the Supreme Court has adopted an unfortunate test to
determine its federal question jurisdiction. See generally C. WIUrT, supra note 1, at 60.
Given that test, however, it appears that the result is correct once it is accepted that the
prima facie case need only allege that the defendant did not keep his half of the bargain.
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further stages in its development. Consider again the infancy issue in
contracts cases. When it is allocated to the defendant, it can no longer
be viewed as an absolute defense because, even if true, the plaintiff
could plead, for example, that he delivered necessaries to the plaintiff.
There is, however, no orderly way to raise this last issue if the question
of infancy is treated as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. The
plaintiff will, consistently with his interest, allege that the defendant
was not an infant, and at that point the defendant has no need to interpose an affirmative plea of his own. He will be able to rest his case on
the denial of the plaintiff's allegation of, as it were noninfancy. There
will thus be no opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the issue of necessaries, for a reply can be made only after a plea in avoidance, and never
after a denial.
The shape of the legal argument has changed, and with that change
the need to allocate issues between the parties takes on new urgency. It
is no longer adequate to speak about the "ifs" and the "unlesses" of a
case, as it was in two-staged systems. Some "ifs," like the plea of necessaries, presuppose an "unless," while others do not. Some "unlesses"
presuppose not only the prima facie case, but a defense and a reply as
well. Further complications follow as a matter of course. It is therefore
necessary to develop rules that determine not only who is under a duty
to raise a given issue-who bears the burden of allegation, so to speakbut also at what level in the argument it is to be raised.
Traditionally, the allocation of issues between the parties has been
treated as a formal question, to be answered by formal means: the party
with the affirmative side of an issue was required to plead it. While
this test will cause complications in particular cases, it does offer a
principled means by which to allocate issues in advance of trial. It also
makes it possible to decide questions of allocation without looking to
the substantive validity of the plea in question, and thus provides a
method of allocation not only of standard pleas whose validity is unquestioned, but also of issues of first impression where the substantive
questions have not been settled.
In spite of its advantages, this method of allocation has been subjected to spirited attack in recent years. Professor Cleary argues that "this
[method of allocation] is no more than a play on words, since practically
any proposition may be stated in either affirmative or negative form.
Thus a plaintiff's exercise of ordinary care equals absence of contributory negligence, in the minority of jurisdictions which place this element in plaintiff's case."3 3 Yet the very example he uses casts doubt on
33 Cleary, supra note 31, at 11.
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his general position. When the issue of contributory negligence is raised
as an affirmative defense, the thrust of the plea is that the plaintiff's
negligence contributed to his own harm.3 4 It asserts a causal relation
between the plaintiff's negligence and his own injury. The reference to
this causal connection is not preserved, however, if the plaintiff must
allege only that he exercised ordinary care, for then the plaintiff could
not show that he was careless, but only in a way that was causally unrelated to the occurrence of his injury, as the law of negligence indeed
entitles him to do.3 5 The causation issue could be reinserted into the
case only if the plaintiff were to allege that, though he did not exercise
ordinary care, his negligence did not cause his harm. But that proposition is in the negative form, which Cleary claimed could always be
avoided in the statement of the issue.
The point, moreover, can be generalized because it is possible to
apply a requirement of affirmative form to all allegations about a party's
acts or duties. Under a theory of strict liability, for example, the prima
facie case will take the form the defendant hit the plaintiff. One might
object to the theory on substantive grounds, but if the allegation is
material to a case at all, then it should be raised by the plaintiff. There
is no assertion in a negative form that has the same meaning; "X did
not hit the plaintiff," for example, will not suffice.3 6 The test of affirmative form thus resolves the question of allocation between the parties in
unique fashion. Moreover, it applies not only to cases where the plaintiff makes a good plea, but also to those in which his allegations are
deficient on substantive grounds. The plaintiff could allege that the
defendant brushed his teeth in the morning, for which there is no negative reformulation. Yet there is no way that the allegation could be
34 Here I use the shorthand that the "negligence" causes the harm in question, even
though a more complete statement of the issue would require the duty analysis discussed
in text at notes 24--26 supra and notes 45-46 infra. In its complete form the want of
equivalence is even more apparent because the defendant's plea of contributory negligence
will identify the specific requirement placed on the plaintiff and the relationship between
the plaintiff's noncompliance with it and his harm. The possibility that noncompliance
with the standard is causally irrelevant cannot be brought out if the plaintiff pleads that
he complied with this standard; reference to the specific standard is lost if the plaintiff
says only that he has satisfied the relevant requirements of due care.
35 "Plaintiff will not, of course, be barred by contributory negligence unless his negligence was a proximate cause of the damage sued for." 2 F. HARPER & F. JAAmS, THE LAw
oF ToRs, § 22.2, at 1199 (1956) (emphasis in original); cf. Mayer v. Petzelt, 311 F.2d 601
(7th Cir. 1962).
86 Indeed, as a substantive matter, the distinction between trespass cases and Good
Samaritan cases rests on the fact that it is impossible to transform the proposition "A
did not help B" into the proposition that "A hurt B." The second embodies notions of
causation that are foreign to the first. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 190-91.
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struck from the complaint on formal grounds even though it could
not (I assume) withstand an attack under a general demurrer.
In those areas of the law, however, in which the defendant is held
liable when he has not acted, this rule of allocation requires further
refinement. A contract or a statute, for example, may create a duty to
act. Cases brought under such a contract or statute rest on the assertion
that the defendant has not done what he is prima facie supposed to do.
Consequently, it would not make sense for the law of pleading to require the plaintiff to allege only affirmative acts. There is no affirmative
equivalent to the proposition that the defendant did not keep his part
of the bargain. It will not do to assert that the defendant breached the
contract, because that is a conclusion of law, which, unlike nonperfor37
mance, admits of no excuse or justification.
As a reflection of the substantive law, the rules of pleading should
require in these cases an affirmative allegation of the source of the
defendant's duty and an assertion of the defendant's nonperformance
thereof. Thus, in contract cases, it should be necessary first to allege the
bargain that prima facie created the duty and then that the defendant
did not keep his part of it.38 The complaint must take the affirmative
form only insofar as the formation of the obligation is concerned, a
constraint that renders it improper to allege that there is no duty because there is no bargain. 39 The variation required for cases involving
statutory duties follows the same pattern.
37 "Breach of promise may be called nonfulfillment." F. JAM Es, supra note 1, at 255.
One could perhaps eliminate the objection based upon pleading conclusions of law by
saying that the plaintiff's prima fade case should be "the defendant broke his promise."
Note, however, that the verbs "breach" and "break" are both odd in that they are not
verbs of action. One does not break a promise, for example, in the same way that he
breaks a chair. These two verbs, though not verbs of action, are most probably used in
contracts cases because of the close relationship they have to "the act" in the law of tort.
Even if the proposition, "you breached your promise" were treated as an exact equivalent
to the proposition that you did not keep your promise, there would still be no real allocation problem because both of these formulations require the plaintiff to raise the issue.
38 On this view the allegation of nonpayment in the typical contracts case must be
treated as part of the prima facie case, even though the Federal Rules require the defendant to plead it as an affirmative defense. If the Federal Rules were correct, then it
should follow that the plaintiff can succeed in a contracts case without mention of a
possible breach of obligation. It also follows that it is most awkward for the defendant
to excuse his nonperformance, since it is not possible to avoid the implications of an allegation not yet made. See C. CLARx, supra note 1, § 45, at 285-86; Reppy, The Anomaly of

Payment as an Affirmative Defense, 10

CORNELL

L.Q. 269 (1925). Nor can the result be

justified on the ground that it is easy for the plaintiff to prove payment by a receipt or
some other means. The burden of proof need not follow the burden of allegation. See
note 43 infra.
39 Thus, in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), the argument

is in effect that the plaintiff should not be allowed to say that the federal statute placed
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Allegations about mental states raise many of the same problems as
those about duties. The crucial point here is that negative expressions
in allegations about mental states are proper only if they go to the content of the mental state and not its existence. Thus it is proper for the
plaintiff to allege that the defendant intended to harm him, not because
the defendant had an intention to act, but because the allegation makes
reference to his mental state. By the same token, the plaintiff can allege
that the defendant intended to be of no assistance to the plaintiff in his
time of need, for the negative portion of the assertion only goes to the
content of the defendant's intention. Nonetheless, the formal constraints will prohibit the defendant's allegation that he had no intention
to harm the plaintiff, because it is not an allegation about a specific
mental state. 40 In both these cases, the issue can of course be raised, but
only by the plaintiff in its proper form, where its sufficiency can then be
judged on substantive grounds.
These arguments show that the requirement of affirmative form, far
from being unintelligible, allows most issues to be allocated in a perfectly straightforward way. There are, however, some cases that create
difficulties for this formal test, even as refined. The issue of infancy, for
example, raises a question not of the defendant's conduct but of his
status. The test of affirmative form offers no guidance as to whether the
plaintiff should be required to allege, as part of his prima facie case, that
the defendant was an adult when he entered into the contract in question, or whether the defendant must raise the issue of infancy. There
are, however, other formal considerations that indicate the way the
problem should be handled. In a system of staged pleas the substantive
law would be altered if the plaintiff were required to raise the question
of age, because it would then be impossible ever to recover against an
infant on his contract. In addition, if the issue of age is allocated to the
plaintiff, it would be necessary as well to require the plaintiff to allege
that the defendant was not insane, not in prison, and not under any
other form of personal disability recognized by the applicable substantive law. Raising all possible questions of status as part of the prima
facie case would, at the very least, make it difficult to treat them in different ways if that should seem appropriate. These complex issues canno duty upon the defendant which excused him from the performance of his half of the
bargain.
40 This indeed is part of the so-called plea of inevitable accident: the defendant was

not negligent and did not intend to harm the plaintiff. The plea was used as a transitional
device to convert the older system of strict liability to one of negligence and harmful
intent. But as a formal matter, the allocation it requires is quite unsound given the position in the text, and today the plaintiff must allege affirmatively either negligence or intent. Cf. Fowler v. Lanning, [1959] 1 Q.B. 426; Stanley v. Powell, [1891] 1 Q.B. 86.
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not be broken down into their component parts for analysis unless each
of them is the subject of its own affirmative defense. Where the test
of affirmative form cannot resolve the problem of allocation-as it cannot in cases of status-we should select that allocation that tends to
simplify the content of a particular plea, for it is always possible in a
system of indefinite pleas to raise the omitted point later in the argument. The desired simplification in status cases requires the defendant
to plead specially the particular disability upon which he chooses to
rely, which is indeed the law today.
Another case where the test of affirmative form cannot resolve the
problem of allocation is the defamation case in which one of the parties
wishes to place in issue the truth or falsity of the defendant's statements about the plaintiff: what is true is not false, and vice versa. As in
the infancy case, it is necessary to determine which allocation better
reduces the burden on each plea and thereby extends the number of
possible pleas in the argument. If the plaintiff must show that the defamatory statements are false, an element is added to the prima facie
case, and, in addition, the plaintiff is foreclosed from recovering for
the injury caused by a true but defamatory accusation. Neither of these
difficulties is encountered if the issue of truth must be raised by a plea
in avoidance. Happily, present law does allocate the issue to the defendant under the rubric of "justification."
The allocation rules developed above can be used to determine
whether a particular issue should be allocated to the plaintiff or to the
defendant. But the task is not complete, for in a system of staged pleadings it is also necessary to decide at which stage in the argument a particular allegation should be introduced. The appropriate stage is best
determined, I believe, by using the common law doctrine of surplusage.
Under that doctrine, if the plaintiff is entitled to the same relief with
allegations A, B, and C as with A and B alone, then C must be struck
from the complaint. The prima facie case, and by extension all pleas,
must not only be sufficient, they must be minimally sufficient as well.
The test in effect requires an economy of means to achieve a given end.
The extra allegations, even if proper in form, serve no useful function;
should they become material at some later stage in the argument, they
can then be raised. To return to the example of the infant's contract, if
the allegation that the defendant did not keep his bargain states a prima
facie case, the plaintiff need not, and should not be allowed to, allege
in his complaint that he has provided the defendant with necessaries.
When and if the defendant has raised the sufficient defense of infancy,
the plaintiff will be free to make his further allegations.
Together, the formal rules discussed above are sufficient in almost
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every case to provide a principled determination of both the party to
whom an issue should be allocated and the stage at which it should be
raised. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that these rules do not represent
the current view on allocation of the burden of allegation. That view,
it seems, looks at the question of allocation not in relation to the formal structure of legal argument, but in terms of the impact that alternative allocations are apt to have on the subsequent course of the
lawsuit, particularly at trial. In any event, three general guidelines are
usually offered as capable of providing a principled resolution of most,
if not all, allocation questions. They are commonly styled the test of
"policy," the test of "fairness," and the test of "probabilities." All of
them suffer from the objection that they cannot tell us how to allocate
issues which, if they prove insufficient as a matter of law, will never give
rise to questions of fact. Yet they are worth examining in some detail
because they are in clear conflict with the formal principles of allocation
developed above.
1. The Test of "Policy." Simply put, the test of policy says that a
party will be required to introduce as part of his case any "disfavored"
contention of substantive law on which he wishes to rely.41 A typical
application of this rule involves the issue of a contributory negligence.
Judges in some jurisdictions do not like the doctrine of contributory
negligence because they believe that it is harsh to excuse a negligent
defendant merely because the plaintiff has been negligent as well. The
test of policy helps, it is claimed, to avoid the disfavored result because
it requires the defendant to plead the issue in his answer and to prove it
at trial in order to escape liability.
This argument, which does not turn on formal principles, is subject
to grave objections. As a pleading requirement, its only possible impact
is pernicious. Once the allocation question is settled, any defense lawyer
who wants to rely on the doctrine of contributory negligence will know
that he is required to plead it specially. The disfavored contention will
be made in all relevant cases save those few in which the defendant's
lawyer makes an elementary mistake. It is hard to see why a modern
system of procedure should take comfort in such slips.
Moreover, the allocation of contributory negligence to the defendant
will not, even to the extent that it controls the burden of proof-either
production or persuasion-have much effect on the outcome of a case.
Where there is no evidence of plaintiff's negligence, or where the evidence is in equipoise, the burden of proof will effectively deny to the
defendant the benefit of the doctrine of contributory negligence. In
41 C. CLARK, supra note

1, § 96, at 609; Cleary, supra note 31, at 11-12.
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most cases, however-particularly if cases that never go to trial are taken
into account-the evidence on the issue will point clearly one way or
the other, and the defendant will not be hurt because the burden of
proof falls on him at the outset. Even in close cases, he will prevail if
the bare preponderance of evidence supports his defense of contributory negligence.42 In any event, his burden is no greater than that
placed on the plaintiff, who must plead and prove the defendant's
negligence even before his own negligence becomes material. But no
one would claim that negligence actions are disfavored. There are
better ways to make proof of contributory negligence more difficult,
if that is desired; the defendant could, for example, be required to
prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, be limited to using only
certain kinds of evidence or be denied the benefits of doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.43
Its defects in practice to one side, the most basic assumption of the
policy test-that a valid plea should be treated as disfavored-is quite
indefensible. The doctrine of contributory negligence has been reexamined countless times and still remains in most jurisdictions an integral
part of the law of torts. The courts should not use the rules of procedure to frustrate the doctrine's application, even as they concede its
place in the substantive law. One may properly argue that the defense of contributory negligence should be replaced by a rule of comparative negligence, or that it should be subject to an exception based
on the doctrine of last clear chance. But once the substantive question
has been decided, the decision should not be undermined by manipulating procedural rules.
2. The Test of "Fairness." The second suggested standard for allocation decisions, that of "fairness," is not intended to have an ethical
connotation." It suggests only that each issue and its burden be allocated for reasons of efficiency to the party with superior access to the
evidence necessary to resolve it as a matter of fact. If the evidence is in
his favor, he will have every incentive to make it known. If it goes
against him, his own silence will seal his defeat.
Clearly, there are difficulties involved in using the test of fairness.
Suppose the defendant has better access to evidence on all issues. Does
42 Cleary notes that the burden operates "as a theoretical, though perhaps not a practical, handicap." Cleary, supra note 31, at 11.
43 "Itis not inconsistent to require the defendant to plead contributory negligence if
he wants to raise the issue, and yet put the burden of proof on the plaintiff if the
issue is raised." Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 757 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.

650 (1940).
44 See Cleary, supra note 31, at 12.
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that mean, under the rule, that the plaintiff need not state a prima facie
case at all? Again, questions of allocation must be resolved not case by
case, but for a whole class of cases, all of which raise a common legal
issue. Contributory negligence must, if only for practical reasons, be allocated to all plaintiffs or to all defendants. Before the trial, the legal system cannot appraise each party's access to evidence in each of the myriad
of factual situations that may underlie a common legal issue. A uniform
rule of pleading is required, but the rationale of the test of "fairness"
implies that no uniform rule of allocation of a particular issue will
always be "fair." In some cases the plaintiff will have better evidence;
in others the defendant. In most, it will be possible to answer the
question only after it has been raised and joined. Considerations of
access could not, then, govern the question of who should raise an issue
at all.
Moreover, whenever the question of access is crucial, there are better
techniques available for handling it. First, discovery procedures can
largely eliminate the problem of unequal access. Under most modem
systems, pre-trial discovery rules enable each party to obtain from his
adversary all relevant evidence, regardless of whether it is admissible at
trial. 45 And the full scope of discovery is available to both parties no
matter who has the duty to raise a certain issue. 46 Second, the burden of proof need not follow the burden of allegation. The burden of
proof can be allowed to shift during the course of trial to the party
who has the better access to needed evidence. Indeed, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur appears in part to have just this function, particularly in malpractice cases. 47 These shifts can be made on a case by case
basis, eliminating the need to tamper with the universal form used to
allocate issues in the pleadings. Since the problems of access can be
handled by these techniques, therefore, the pleadings need not be used
to deal with them, but can be left to help structure the rules of substantive law, the one task they can do well.
3. "The Probabilitiesof the Situation." On any disputed question
of fact, one party is probably in the right and the other is wrong. From
this truism it is sometimes argued that it should be possible to require
the party who is more likely to be wrong to plead the issue and to prove
the relevant facts. 48 For example, if it could be shown that plaintiffs

are usually not contributorally negligent, the proposed rule would
place on the defendant the duty to plead and prove contributory
45 FED. R. Civ. PRO. 26(b)(1).
46 See id.
47 E.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).

48 See Cleary, supra note 81, at 12-14.
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negligence. Where there is no evidence on the question, this burden of
proof would be decisive in the individual case, while in the class of
cases, we would more often than not achieve the correct results.
Factual probabilities are, of course, difficult to ascertain and to
apply.49 No one has made, or most likely ever will make, the kind of
statistical inquiry into contributory negligence, for example, that would
render respectable the use of a probabilistic statement of this sort.
Hence, to rely on the probabilities of the situation, judges would be
forced to make intuitive estimates of the probabilities that in most
cases will at best be of uncertain worth. Even an intuitive estimate of
the probabilities suggests a great variation across the range of negligence cases, indicating, as with the fairness test, that no uniform pleading rule is possible. What do we need to know to decide whether it is
more likely than not that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence in a two car collision? Not all collision cases are alike; yet there
is no way to accommodate these differences in a single plea of contributory negligence. The "probabilities of the situation" test may bear
on questions of proof but it has no importance in pleading matters.
Each of the three suggested criteria for allocation has serious internal weaknesses. Assuming, however, that each of the tests points to one
result or the other, how does one balance and weigh their results when
they conflict? The "policy" test suggests, for example, that the issue of
contributory negligence should be allocated to the defendant's case,
while the access test would place it with the plaintiff, at least if he is
alive. The probabilities test does not appear to point in either direction.
There is no basis for giving either of the conflicting tests any greater
weight than the other; nor does it seem possible to find a mathematical
rule, or an intuitive substitute, to reduce these distinct tests to a common measure.
Even when they point in one direction, the three tests can produce
results that should give us reason to pause. With regard to the issue of
the defendant's negligence, for example, the combined application of
the three tests may well indicate that the defendant himself should
raise the issue. Negligence actions are not disfavored; the probabilities
do not appear to cut strongly either way; and the defendant generally
does have better access to the relevant evidence about his conduct. The
indicated allocation is unacceptable on substantive grounds, of course,
49 See the extensive debate on the desirability of the use of statistical evidence for the
resolution of disputed questions of fact in Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1970); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1329 (1971); Finkelstein &
Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARv. L. REv. 1801 (1971); Tribe, A
Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. Rav. 1810 (1971).
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because the plaintiff would not have to allege anything on his own
behalf in order to upset the initial balance between the parties.
That none of the tests alone nor all of them together can resolve
questions of allocation should not be surprising. The need for an allocation of issues between the parties did not arise to solve the problems
of proof at trial, but on account of formal considerations; the logic of
legal rules, of presumptions and exceptions, requires an indefinite
alternations of pleas between the parties, whatever substantive legal
theories may be involved. The reasons that make some allocation necessary demand that it be done by formal means alone, and not by the
pragmatic tests offered to replace them. The rules of form developed
above are, no doubt, far from perfect, but at least they are a step in the
right direction.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many of the views expressed in this article were accepted at one
time as part of the law of pleading. All of them rest on the assumption
that the legal rules of entitlement and responsibility form not a system
of absolute rules, but rather a system of presumptions. From that premise at least three conclusions follow. First, it is both possible and
necessary to distinguish between ultimate issues of fact and conclusions of law. Second, the structure of a legal argument cannot be
limited arbitrarily to the presentation of claim and defense, but must, as
at common law, be extended as far as the parties to the lawsuit want to
take it. Third, there must be some formal means, such as the rules of
affirmative form and minimum sufficiency, to allocate the issues of a
case not only between the parties to the suit but also among the stages
of the legal argument.
Today the parties to a lawsuit do not plead their case in accordance
with the common law rules set out in this article, and, of course, there
is no reason to reinstitute the worst features of the forms of action at
common law by insisting that they be complied with at the earliest
stages of a case. Nonetheless, an appreciation of these rules could be of
use in the conduct of litigation. It could help attorneys to identify the
strengths and weakenesses of their case before they commit themselves
to costly litigation, assist at pre-trial conference in isolating the issues
to be tried, and facilitate the more precise formulation of legal issues
on appeal. Even if the rules could not do much to improve the operation
of the legal system, they remain of great value in efforts to systemize
the rules of substantive law and thus to make them both more coherent
and more just.

